Hassan Magulumali
As Tanzania prepares to engage with Russia ahead of the Third Russia–Africa Summit, the central question should not simply be whether Moscow can offer Africa an alternative to Western markets.
The more important question is whether Tanzania can enter the Russian market on terms that actually reduce dependency, expand African exports and create long-term economic value.
The Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum is scheduled for October 28–29, 2026, with trade, investment, payment systems, digitalisation and food security among the issues expected to dominate discussions.
According to the Tanzania Trade Development Authority (TanTrade), Tanzania has an estimated additional export opportunity of about $14 million in Russia between 2026 and 2030. Coffee alone represents an estimated $3.8 million opportunity, followed by avocados at $1.8 million, cocoa beans, flowers, cloves and cashews. Meat, fruits and flowers are also identified as products with potential in the Russian market.
Tanzania’s exports to Russia reached $29.5 million in 2025, rising sharply from $7.1 million in 2021. Yet imports from Russia were worth $253.4 million, leaving Tanzania with a trade deficit of about $223.9 million.
The immediate opportunity lies in agricultural and agro-processed products.
Coffee, cashews, cloves, cocoa, fruits, flowers, meat and avocados could become important export lines if Tanzania develops the logistics, certification, packaging and market intelligence required by Russian buyers.
However, Tanzania should avoid repeating the traditional African export model of sending raw commodities abroad while importing higher-value finished products.
The Ministry of Industry and Trade therefore faces a bigger challenge than simply promoting Tanzanian products at trade exhibitions.
It needs a Russia market-entry strategy that identifies specific Russian buyers, distribution networks, import regulations, payment channels, shipping routes and opportunities for processing products inside Tanzania before export.
Without that preparation, increased trade could simply mean more African raw materials leaving the continent without creating enough industrial jobs or value locally.
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Russia remains heavily affected by Western sanctions, while the European Union adopted another package of sanctions in July 2026 targeting Russian energy, financial services, trade and other sectors.
This creates a complicated environment for African exporters.
A Tanzanian company may find a willing Russian buyer but still face difficulties with international banks, insurance, shipping, currency conversion and cross-border payments.
Africa must therefore avoid creating an export relationship that becomes impossible to operate whenever financial restrictions tighten.
The issue is bigger than Tanzania.
Research has previously warned that sanctions affecting dollar and euro transactions can disrupt African trade with Russia because a large proportion of international trade is invoiced through those currencies.
This means the Foreign Ministry should not approach Russia–Africa relations purely as a diplomatic opportunity.
It should also examine the geopolitical and financial consequences for Tanzanian businesses.
Russia’s growing engagement with Africa is often presented as evidence that African countries now have alternatives to Western economic influence.
That argument has some merit.
Africa needs diversified markets. It should be able to trade with Europe, the United States, China, Russia, India, the Gulf states and emerging markets without being forced into dependence on any single bloc.
But diversification only works if African countries gain bargaining power.
Recent analysis of Russia’s economic footprint in Southern Africa shows that Russia’s share of the region’s external trade remains small compared with China and the European Union. The same analysis highlights significant trade imbalances in countries including Tanzania, where Russian imports substantially outweigh exports.
The lesson is clear: Russia should be treated as an additional market—not automatically as Africa’s replacement for the West.
The Ministry of Industry and Trade should arrive at the summit with a measurable export agenda rather than a general promise to increase cooperation.
Tanzania could identify priority products, target Russian companies, negotiate simplified procedures for selected exports and establish mechanisms for resolving payment and logistics problems.
At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should ensure that economic diplomacy protects Tanzania from geopolitical pressure from either side.
The goal should not be to choose Moscow over Washington, Brussels or Beijing.
The goal should be to make all of them compete for African markets and African products.
For Tanzania, the Russia market could become useful—but only if the country enters it as an exporter with bargaining power, not merely as another destination for imported goods.
The real success of the Russia–Africa Summit will therefore not be measured by the number of agreements signed in Moscow.
It will be measured by whether African countries leave with more markets, more manufacturing, stronger payment systems, higher-value exports and greater economic independence.
For Tanzania, that preparation must begin before the summit—not after the cameras have gone.
