The global dominance of the US dollar has created a financial system in which decisions made in Washington can reach far beyond America’s borders, affecting governments, companies and even countries that have no direct political relationship with the United States.
Russia, Iran and Venezuela offer some of the clearest examples.
Because a large share of international trade and finance is conducted in dollars, access to the US financial system can become a powerful instrument of economic pressure. A recent academic study argues that Washington has increasingly used the dollar’s international role to enforce sanctions and exert jurisdiction over foreign companies and institutions, including through the threat of losing access to dollar transactions.
The consequences are not limited to countries targeted directly by Washington.
Foreign banks and companies can also face pressure to comply with US sanctions even when their activities are outside US territory. The academic study notes that the centrality of the dollar has encouraged international businesses to “over-comply” with US sanctions, sometimes abandoning transactions that may otherwise be lawful under US rules simply to avoid losing access to the dollar-based financial system.
Iran remains a current example. In September 2026, the US Treasury announced new sanctions against individuals and entities across several jurisdictions connected to Iranian military procurement. Washington also warned foreign entities that facilitating sanctions evasion could expose them to restrictions on access to the US financial system.
Russia has faced an even broader financial squeeze. US and European sanctions have restricted Russian banks from participating in dollar- and euro-based transactions, creating consequences for countries trading with Russia. Research from Brookings estimated that currency sanctions alone had the potential to disrupt a portion of African trade because African-Russian commerce was heavily dependent on dollar and euro invoicing.
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For Africa, this raises a larger question: How much economic sovereignty can a country exercise when its international trade depends heavily on financial infrastructure controlled outside the continent?
The issue is particularly important for African economies seeking to expand trade with Russia, China, Iran and other emerging markets. A financial dispute between Washington and another country can potentially become an African trade problem when banks, insurers, shipping companies and exporters become concerned about secondary sanctions.
Venezuela provides another illustration of the vulnerability created by dependence on international financial channels. When access to major financial institutions is restricted, the impact can extend beyond governments to businesses, importers and ordinary citizens.
The debate is therefore no longer simply about the dollar as a currency. It is about who controls the infrastructure through which global commerce moves.
For African countries, reducing vulnerability does not necessarily mean abandoning the dollar overnight. It means developing greater financial options: stronger African payment systems, increased intra-African trade, local-currency settlement, diversified reserves and deeper links between African financial institutions.
The emergence of alternative payment mechanisms among BRICS members reflects this broader search for alternatives to dollar dependence. Scholars have argued that attempts to reduce reliance on the dollar are partly driven by concern over its coercive use in international finance.
Africa therefore faces a strategic choice about financial sovereignty.
A continent that produces minerals, agricultural commodities, energy and other resources should not have its international economic choices determined entirely by financial systems located thousands of kilometres away.
The lesson from Russia, Iran and Venezuela is clear: when one currency becomes deeply embedded in global finance, control over that currency’s financial infrastructure can become a source of political influence far beyond national borders.
For Africa, building alternatives is ultimately about ensuring that the continent’s economic relationships are decided by African interests rather than by the financial pressure of any single external power.
