MWE Correspondent
The global battle for strategic minerals has entered a more intense phase , and Africa is now at the center of that competition.
As Western countries scramble to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains, and Beijing moves to protect and expand its already dominant position, African states rich in cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite and rare earths are becoming the focus of a high-stakes geopolitical contest. What makes this moment especially important is that the competition is no longer theoretical. It is now being driven by real agreements, financing plans, supply disruptions, and diplomatic pressure that are unfolding across multiple continents — with African resources increasingly seen as essential to the future of electric vehicles, defense industries, renewable energy systems and advanced manufacturing.
One of the clearest signs of this accelerating race came this week when Japan and France formalized a new rare earth cooperation roadmap aimed at reducing reliance on China. Reuters reported that the deal supports the Caremag refining project in southern France, which is expected to begin operations in late 2026. Under the plan, Japan wants to source about 20% of its future demand for dysprosium and terbium from that facility. Those metals are vital for magnets used in electric vehicles, offshore wind turbines and electronics. The same Reuters report noted that Japan has already cut its dependence on Chinese rare earth supply from 90% in 2010 to around 60% today, a dramatic shift that shows how seriously major industrial powers now view supply security.
That deal is not directly about Africa, but it tells us something critical: the West and its allies are actively redesigning global mineral supply chains, and they need African resources to make that strategy work. This is especially true because rare earth elements, cobalt, copper and lithium are no longer just commodities. They are strategic assets tied to industrial sovereignty, military capability, battery production and the wider green transition. In practical terms, whoever controls access to these materials will influence the next generation of energy systems, transport technology and digital infrastructure.
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China understands this better than anyone, which is why Beijing continues to move aggressively across Africa. A major example came last week in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Kinshasa signed a new agreement with China to deepen cooperation in the mining sector. Reuters reported that Congo — the world’s leading producer of cobalt and home to vast reserves of copper, lithium, coltan and other battery metals — agreed to expand cooperation on geological data sharing, investment protection, and the promotion of local raw material processing. Congolese exports to China are also set to gain duty-free access from May 1, under a broader initiative covering 53 African countries.
This is a major development because China already dominates much of Congo’s mining ecosystem. Reuters noted that Chinese companies including CMOC, Zijin and Huayou remain deeply entrenched in Congolese mineral extraction, while Beijing is also Congo’s largest bilateral creditor. That gives China an advantage the West has struggled to match: it is not just buying minerals, it is embedded in financing, infrastructure, processing, debt relations and long-term political influence. In other words, China’s mineral strategy in Africa is integrated, not transactional.
The United States and its allies are trying to respond, but they are doing so from a weaker position in many parts of Africa. Reuters reported that Washington signed a strategic partnership with Congo in December designed to redirect mineral supply, reduce China’s dominance, and boost Western investment. But the Congolese government has made clear it is not waiting forever for promises to become projects. Kinshasa has already indicated it will seek other partners if U.S. plans fail to produce concrete investment and infrastructure. That is a powerful lesson. In 2026, African governments are increasingly willing to engage multiple powers at once — not out of ideological loyalty, but to maximize leverage and bargaining power.
This same pattern is visible globally. Earlier in March, Reuters reported that Japan, France and Canada were working on alternatives to a U.S.-led critical minerals bloc, with some officials discussing a buyers’ club, import quotas, and subsidies for non-Chinese mining projects. That report noted that China still controls more than 90% of global rare earth supply chains in some segments, which explains why governments are now willing to back more expensive alternative projects rather than remain vulnerable to future export restrictions. Canada alone, according to Reuters, has signed 30 new mining-related deals with 12 countries, bringing total proposed investment to about C$18 billion since October.
For Africa, this rivalry creates both opportunity and danger. The opportunity is obvious: more bidders mean stronger negotiating power. Countries such as Congo, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique can use this competition to demand better royalties, stronger environmental safeguards, local processing plants, skills transfer, rail and port investment, and domestic manufacturing partnerships. If African states negotiate wisely, they can move from being mere exporters of raw ore to becoming industrial participants in the battery and clean energy value chain.
But the danger is equally real. Without strategic discipline, this mineral rush can quickly become a new form of neocolonialism — one in which African land is mined harder, ecosystems are damaged faster, and foreign powers capture most of the value while local communities remain poor. Too often, mineral-rich areas still suffer from pollution, displacement, weak labor protections, illicit trade, and public revenues that never fully reach citizens. In countries where governance remains fragile, critical minerals can also intensify corruption, conflict and elite capture rather than produce national development.
That is why the central issue is not whether Africa should work with China or the West. The real issue is whether African nations can impose terms that protect sovereignty. This means revising extraction contracts, enforcing transparent licensing, requiring partial local refining, building strategic mineral reserves, and using regional blocs to negotiate collectively rather than individually. It also means linking mineral policy to industrial policy. A country exporting lithium but importing finished batteries at high cost is not exercising sovereignty; it is subsidizing someone else’s industrial future.
In 2026, the contest for Africa’s critical minerals is no longer a background trend — it is one of the defining geopolitical stories of the decade. Western countries are racing to break dependence on China. China is moving to defend and expand its lead. And African governments are increasingly aware that they are sitting on the resources that could shape the next global economic order.
The winners will not simply be the countries with the most minerals underground. They will be the countries that turn those minerals into infrastructure, technology, jobs and long-term national power above ground.
