MWE Correspondent
The latest turmoil surrounding the International Criminal Court is once again forcing African governments, legal scholars, and diplomats to confront a difficult question:
can global justice be trusted when its institutions are seen as politically uneven, internally unstable, and vulnerable to great-power influence? Across the continent, the debate is not only about whether the ICC still matters. It is about whether African nations should keep relying on external legal institutions to define accountability in moments of crisis — or whether this is the moment to invest more seriously in domestic and regional legal power.
That debate has gained fresh urgency because the court itself is facing a major credibility test. Reuters reported on March 22 that allegations of sexual misconduct against ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan were still under review by the court’s executive branch, the Assembly of States Parties, despite claims by Khan’s lawyers that an outside panel of judges had found no evidence of misconduct or breach of duty. Khan had temporarily stepped aside while the matter remained unresolved, and Reuters noted that no final decision had yet been taken by the ICC’s governing body. This uncertainty was not just a personal scandal. It exposed the court to a deeper institutional crisis at the very moment it was already facing geopolitical pressure from powerful states unhappy with its recent investigations.
For African observers, that matters because the ICC has long presented itself as the world’s court of last resort — a body meant to stand above politics. But when its top prosecutor becomes the subject of unresolved internal controversy, and when major decisions become entangled in diplomatic tension, critics gain fresh ammunition. The perception of justice is often as important as justice itself. A court that is legally sound but politically distrusted can still lose moral authority.
At the same time, the ICC is trying to demonstrate that it is not focused only on Africa. Reuters reported on March 12 that the court had opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity by Belarus, specifically involving the deportation of political opponents into neighboring Lithuania. Because Lithuania is an ICC member, prosecutors argued that part of the crime occurred on its territory, giving the court jurisdiction even though Belarus itself is not a member. This was a significant legal move. It showed the ICC expanding its reach beyond Africa and using creative jurisdictional reasoning to pursue accountability in Europe. For defenders of the court, that is important evidence against the long-standing claim that the ICC is mainly an African court in practice.
Yet for many in Africa, one new European investigation does not erase years of accumulated skepticism. The deeper issue has never been only about geography. It has been about consistency, selectivity, and power. The ICC’s early case history created a durable impression that African states, African leaders, and African conflicts were more likely to become the visible face of international criminal justice, while major global powers often remained partially insulated by non-membership, diplomatic protection, or enforcement obstacles. Even when the court widens its scope, that older memory remains politically alive.
This is why the current moment is not just about criticism of the ICC — it is about the future of legal sovereignty in Africa. More governments are beginning to ask whether accountability for grave crimes should depend so heavily on institutions outside the continent. That does not mean African states are defending impunity. In many cases, the argument is the opposite: justice must exist, but it should increasingly be rooted in stronger domestic courts, specialized prosecution units, constitutional safeguards, and credible regional mechanisms that can act without always waiting for outside intervention.
That is a crucial distinction. Too often, the debate is falsely framed as “ICC or no justice.” But a more serious African legal strategy would ask a different question: how can the continent build systems strong enough that external courts become a last resort rather than a first political instinct? This is where investment in judicial institutions becomes a matter of sovereignty, not just law. If national courts can investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption networks, and state abuses credibly, then African governments gain both legal control and political legitimacy.
The wider politics of international law make this even more urgent. The ICC operates in a world where some of the most powerful countries are not members. Reuters noted in its March 22 report that the court’s membership does not include the United States, China, or Russia. That fact alone shapes global perceptions. When powerful states remain outside the system, but still influence it through diplomacy, sanctions, or pressure campaigns, the ideal of universal justice becomes harder to defend. The court may still be legally principled, but it exists inside an unequal geopolitical environment — and African governments are increasingly unwilling to ignore that reality.
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At the same time, abandoning the ICC altogether would be a mistake. In situations where domestic systems collapse, political elites shield themselves, or armed groups dominate entire regions, the court can still serve as an important backstop. Victims of atrocities often have nowhere else to turn. That is why the smartest African approach may not be withdrawal, but reform combined with institutional self-strengthening. The goal should not be to destroy international justice. The goal should be to make sure Africa is not permanently dependent on external justice.
That means strengthening prosecutors, improving forensic capacity, protecting judicial independence, investing in witness protection systems, and expanding regional legal cooperation. It also means pushing for greater transparency inside the ICC itself: clearer case-selection standards, stronger oversight of prosecutors, more balanced global engagement, and more respect for the principle of complementarity the idea that national systems should lead whenever they are able and willing.
There is also a diplomatic lesson here. Just as Africa is trying to gain more control over minerals, trade, finance, and energy, it must also think seriously about control over law. Sovereignty is incomplete if a continent can negotiate hard on resources but remains structurally dependent when it comes to justice and legal legitimacy. In a world where law is increasingly entangled with geopolitics, the ability to prosecute serious crimes at home becomes part of national power.
The ICC still matters. But the current crisis around its leadership, the renewed debate over bias, and the expansion of its investigations beyond Africa have reopened a much bigger question: who defines justice in a changing global order? For Africa, the answer may not lie in rejecting international courts outright. It may lie in building legal systems strong enough that external institutions no longer dominate the continent’s most sensitive political and moral battles.
